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DETENTION AFTER THE AUMF
Stephen I. Vladeck*
On his second full day in office, President Obama issued an executive
order expressing both his desire and his plan to close the detention facility
at the U.S. naval base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.1 Well over five years
later, Guantánamo remains open—with a population that has slowly ebbed
to 154 noncitizens2—“a continuing symbol not just of one of the United
States’ more controversial post–September 11 counterterrorism initiatives,
but of one of the Obama Administration’s more disheartening policy
failures.”3
Closing Guantánamo has proven difficult for a host of reasons. For
starters, returning those detainees who have been cleared for release to their
home countries has been far more difficult than the Obama Administration
initially anticipated, due to a combination of (1) diplomatic resistance on
the part of those countries to which the detainees would be sent;4 and
(2) onerous restrictions on detainee transfers imposed by Congress in a
series of appropriations bills beginning in 2011.5 Even though the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (NDAA) largely relaxed
the foreign transfer restrictions,6 that development has increased the pace of
transfers out of Guantánamo only marginally7—and, as significantly, did
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1. Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base
and Closure of Detention Facilities, Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22,
2009).
2. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Detainee Transfer Announed (Mar. 13, 2014),
available at http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=16578; see also The
Guantánamo Docket, N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo (last updated
Dec. 31, 2013).
3. Stephen Vladeck, How To Get Out of Gitmo—Now, MSNBC.COM (Jan. 22, 2014,
4:43 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/how-get-out-gitmo-now.
4. Cf. Editorial, A Glimmer of Sense on Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2013, at
A24.
5. See generally Recent Legislation, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 1028, 126 Stat. 1632, 1914–17 (codified at 10 U.S.C.
§ 801 note (2012)), 127 HARV. L. REV. 835, 836 (2013) (summarizing the evolution of the
detainee transfer restrictions).
6. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66,
§ 1035, 127 Stat. 672, 851–52 (2013).
7. At the time of publication, only nine detainees have been transferred since the
NDAA was adopted. See The Guantánamo Docket, supra note 2.
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not affect the continuing ban on transfers of detainees into the United
States.8
The courts have also complicated matters. In different decisions, the
D.C. Circuit has separately refused to (1) equate a right to habeas relief with
a right to outright release from detention;9 or (2) interpose any judicial
safeguards on potentially unlawful transfers out of Guantánamo.10
Militating somewhat in the other direction, the D.C. Circuit’s rulings thus
far with respect to the Guantánamo military commissions have dramatically
reduced the number of prisoners whose cases can be resolved through those
proceedings. The reduction in potential cases is illustrated by the court’s
decision in Hamdan v. United States (Hamdan II), which held that the
commissions cannot try offenses committed prior to the enactment of the
Military Commissions Act of 2006 if they were not recognized as
international war crimes at the time of the underlying conduct.11 If that
holding is affirmed,12 it will create an additional subset of detainees with
uncertain fates.13
But inasmuch as the “cleared-for-transfer” and “slated-for-trial”
detainees pose difficult questions for the U.S. government going forward,
the central obstacle to closing Guantánamo has been a third, core group of
detainees—forty-five,14 as of this writing—whom the government has
designated as too dangerous to be released, and yet in each of whose cases
an array of evidentiary or substantive roadblocks preclude a criminal trial,
whether before a civilian court or a military commission.15 So long as this
group exists, closing Guantánamo was never going to be synonymous with
ending military detention; even if other detainees could be sent overseas or
8. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66,
§ 1034, 127 Stat. at 851.
9. See Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009), vacated and remanded per
curiam, 559 U.S. 131 (2010), reinstated as modified per curiam, 605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir.
2010).
10. See Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
11. See, e.g., Hamdan v. United States (Hamdan II), 696 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
12. On September 30, 2013, the D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, heard oral argument on
whether to revisit Hamdan II in Al-Bahlul v. United States, No. 11-1324, 2013 WL 297726
(D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013), vacated per curiam, No. 11-1324, slip op. at 1–2 (D.C. Cir. Apr.
25, 2013) (providing the briefing and oral argument schedule for rehearing en banc). Its
decision remained pending at the time this Article went to print.
13. See Jennifer Daskal, Hamdan v. United States: A Death Knell for Military
Commissions?, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 875, 895–98 (2013).
14. The original group identified by the task force that President Obama established to
implement his executive order included forty-eight detainees. See Charlie Savage, No Terror
Evidence Against Some Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2010, at A15. Two have since died.
See Carol Rosenberg, FOIA Suit Reveals Guantánamo’s “Indefinite” Detainees, MIAMI
HERALD (June 17, 2013), http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/06/17/3456267/foia-suitreveals-guantanamos.html. A third, Mahmoud Abd al-Aziz al-Mujahid, was recently
recommended for release by a Department of Defense Periodic Review Board. See Julie
Tate, Panel: Yemeni Detainee Should Be Transferred Out of Guantanamo, WASH. POST
(Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/panel-yemenidetainee-should-be-transferred-out-of-guantanamo/2014/01/09/ca5f81fe-7979-11e3-b1c5739e63e9c9a7_story.html.
15. See GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 22 (2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/ag/guantanamo-review-final-report.pdf.
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tried in the United States, there would still be the “unreleasable” forty-five
detainees.16
Although it may not be obvious, it has been clear for some time that this
group of detainees has been the elephant in the room in the debate over
closing Guantánamo. What has been less clear, but is no less true, is that it
is increasingly playing a role in another, larger, conversation: the growing
legal and policy headaches caused by the increasingly outdated September
2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force17 (AUMF).
The AUMF, enacted in the immediate aftermath of the attacks of
September 11, 2001, has increasingly been invoked in recent years as
justification for uses of force against groups with no connection to the
September 11 attacks—often with little transparency from the U.S.
government as to who these groups are, or how they are connected to al
Qaeda or the Taliban.18 As for the original targets of force under the
AUMF, President Obama has himself emphasized the decimation of al
Qaeda’s “core,”19 and the impending withdrawal of U.S. combat troops
from Afghanistan—perhaps as early as the end of 2014—underscores the
extent to which the conflict Congress authorized over twelve years ago is
increasingly reaching its “tipping point.”20
Thus, although there are a number of competing proposals setting forth
the legal paradigm that the United States should adopt with respect to uses
of force against emerging terrorist threats after the AUMF,21 the case for
preserving the AUMF in its current form has little to do with continuing
uses of force against al Qaeda and the Taliban, and everything to do with
uses of force against other groups (arguably beyond the AUMF’s
purview)—and with preserving detention authority for the current
Guantánamo detainees.22 Thus, inasmuch as these forty-five detainees have
been the tail that has wagged the Guantánamo debate, they are also
increasingly becoming the tail wagging the AUMF debate, as well.
In this Article, I argue that a legal and political solution for these fortyfive detainees—and, therefore, a political solution for closing Guantánamo
16. Indeed, that number may be even higher once the pending military commission
appeals are resolved, since those cases may result in additional detainees whom the
government previously thought it could try before a military commission.
17. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)).
18. See generally Jennifer Daskal & Stephen I. Vladeck, After the AUMF, 5 HARV.
NAT’L SECURITY J. 115 (2014).
19. President Barack Obama, Address at the National Defense University (May
23, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarkspresident-national-defense-university.
20. Jeh Charles Johnson, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Defense, Speech at Oxford Union: The
Conflict Against Al Qaeda and Its Affiliates: How Will It End? (Nov. 30, 2012), available
at http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/11/jeh-johnson-speech-at-the-oxford-union/.
21. See Robert M. Chesney, Beyond the Battlefield, Beyond al Qaeda: The
Destabilizing Legal Architecture of Counterterrorism, 112 MICH. L. REV. 163, 212–24
(2013); see also Daskal & Vladeck, supra note 18.
22. See generally Gregory D. Johnsen, 60 Words and a War Without End: The Untold
Story of the Most Dangerous Sentence in U.S. History, BUZZFEED (Jan. 16, 2014, 11:52 PM),
http://www.buzzfeed.com/gregorydjohnsen/60-words-and-a-war-without-end-the-untoldstory-of-the-most.
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and repealing the AUMF—is at least descriptively plausible. Indeed, as
Part I explains, statutory authority could be modeled on (or take the form of
a modest amendment to) section 412 of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001,23
which authorizes short-term detention of noncitizen24 terrorism suspects.
Although it has never been utilized, section 412 already provides a
mechanism for the very detention that the government arguably seeks with
regard to these men, along with robust procedural safeguards to ensure that
they are only held for as long as they continue to pose a threat to the United
States—as determined not by the executive branch, but by a federal judge.25
Moreover, although section 412 expressly contemplates only seven days of
noncriminal detention, Part I demonstrates that the statute clearly envisions
a small class of cases in which, for security reasons, longer-term detention
is justified.26
If one can argue that the Guantánamo cases can fall within the scope of
the longer-term detention authority provided by section 412, then the far
harder question becomes whether such an application of section 412 (or a
comparable statute) would be constitutional. Part II turns to this question,
assessing it against the backdrop of the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
regarding due process constraints on civil commitment. As Part II explains,
the government must be required to make a series of showings concerning
both the dangerousness of the detainee and the unavailability of alternative
dispositions (on the periodic basis required by section 412). But so long as
the government can substantiate these determinations, and so long as due
process constraints (or the statute itself) limit the scope of such authority to
these “legacy” cases, it is likely that such detention of a small group of
noncitizens would be upheld by the Supreme Court—even without the
AUMF. In short, section 412, or a comparable statute, would provide a
compromise framework within which to allow for detention of many—if
not most—of the forty-five detainees, not until the “cessation of hostilities,”
but for as long as they continue to pose a threat to the United States. At the
same time, the adoption of a solution for these cases should also clear the
way for meaningful resolution of both the larger Guantánamo and AUMF
debates.
To be sure, such an argument is unlikely to mollify any constituency.
Those who have been among the most vocal critics of Guantánamo would
be the last to endorse any “solution” that has at its core the continuing
noncriminal detention of any group of the detainees—regardless of where
or under what circumstances. All the more so if such a solution is
perceived as potential authorization for additional detention going forward.
On the flip side, those who believe that the government should have the
23. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 412,
115 Stat. 272, 350–52 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a (2012)).
24. For a host of reasons, noncriminal detention of U.S. citizens raises a far more
difficult set of legal questions, at least partly due to the so-called Non-Detention Act, 18
U.S.C. § 4001(a).
25. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(b).
26. See id. § 1226a(a)(6).
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power to detain these individuals indefinitely will certainly resist the stricter
standards that application of the Due Process Clause will require, or the
periodic review that may make it increasingly difficult for the government
to satisfy such procedural and substantive rules.
But as this Article concludes, when backstopped by the appropriate due
process considerations, a narrower detention authority such as section 412,
while far from ideal, offers a least-worst solution to an increasingly
intractable problem: with regard to new and future cases, the far greater
availability of domestic criminal forums for trials of overseas terrorism
cases (especially as compared to in the days and weeks after September 11)
will make it far more difficult for the government to satisfy the due process
concerns that Part II identifies. And with regard to legacy cases, section
412 would only authorize detention of a proper subset of the current
Guantánamo detainee population, in civil—rather than military—detention,
and with far more regularized judicial, as opposed to administrative, review.
At the same time, such statutory authority would remove the elephant in
the room from the AUMF reform conversation, allowing Congress to
resolve that issue on its own merits, rather than having to be dragged down
by Guantánamo’s baggage. Such a blueprint for compromise could thereby
provide a better legal framework for the legacy cases, in exchange for
repudiating the paradigm under which those cases were able to arise in the
first place.
I. GUANTÁNAMO, THE AUMF, AND SECTION 412
To introduce the argument at the heart of this Article, Part I begins by
surveying the current state of the law regarding the government’s authority
to detain the noncitizens held at Guantánamo, and explores how section 412
could fit into that framework.
A. Detention Under the AUMF and NDAA
At the heart of both Guantánamo detention policy and the broader current
debate over the scope of the U.S. government’s authority to use force
against terrorist groups connected to al Qaeda is the AUMF.27 Enacted one
week after September 11, the operative provision of that statute authorizes
the president
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed,
or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts
of international terrorism against the United States by such nations,
organizations or persons.28

The scope of the AUMF as applied to U.S. citizens, or to noncitizens
arrested within the territorial United States, remains unclear today, and
27. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)).
28. Id. § 2(a).
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controversially so.29 But with regard to noncitizens captured outside the
territorial United States, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 201230 confirmed that such individuals may be detained so long as
they “planned, authorized, committed, or aided” the September 11 attacks
or harbored those who did, or are
part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated
forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its
coalition partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent
act or has directly supported such hostilities in aid of such enemy
forces.31

While there are serious questions concerning the scope and viability of
the “substantial support” prong for detention,32 all of the cases to arise thus
far have turned on the membership prong—with the government arguing
that the detainee in question was “part of” al Qaeda or the Taliban.33 And
in a series of decisions that have been well documented elsewhere,34 the
D.C. Circuit has largely sided with the government in these cases, holding,
among other things, that the government need only demonstrate
membership by a preponderance of the evidence,35 that courts should use
“conditional probability analysis” in assessing that evidence,36 that hearsay
is generally admissible,37 and that vitiation and/or lack of dangerousness are
not relevant to the government’s continuing detention authority under the
AUMF.38 Thus, the law of the D.C. Circuit today appears to contemplate
continuing authority to detain until the cessation of the hostilities Congress
authorized in the AUMF—if not for some “wind-down” period thereafter,
as well.39

29. See, e.g., Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2013), petition for cert. filed, 82
U.S.L.W. 3385 (U.S. Dec. 16, 2013) (No. 13-758). See generally Marty Lederman & Steve
Vladeck, The NDAA: The Good, the Bad, and the Laws of War—Part I, LAWFARE (Dec. 31,
2011, 4:43 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/12/the-ndaa-the-good-the-bad-and-thelaws-of-war-part-i.
30. Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298 (2011).
31. Id. § 1021(b)(2), 125 Stat. at 1562.
32. Steve Vladeck, What Hedges Could Have Said . . ., LAWFARE (Sept. 18, 2012, 1:38
PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/09/what-hedges-could-have-said.
33. See id.
34. See, e.g., Jonathan Hafetz, Calling the Government To Account: Habeas Corpus in
the Aftermath of Boumediene, 57 WAYNE L. REV. 99 (2011); Stephen I. Vladeck, The D.C.
Circuit After Boumediene, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1451 (2011).
35. See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
36. See Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
37. Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 879.
38. See, e.g., Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at
871. Although the petitioners in both cases argued that they were no longer subject to
detention, the D.C. Circuit ignored this argument, holding that the only question was
whether they were ever subject to detention under the AUMF.
39. Cf. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948) (upholding the detention of German
nationals under the Alien Enemy Act of 1798 despite the passage of time since the May 1945
unconditional surrender of the Nazi government, because the termination of war was a
political determination unrelated to the cessation of hostilities).
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B. Detention and the AUMF’s Looming “Tipping Point”
At the same time, there appears to be little question that, as current
Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson has put it, we are reaching a
“tipping point” in the conflict Congress authorized back in 2001.40
Whatever the permissible scope of the AUMF as applied to affiliates or
“associated forces” of al Qaeda and the Taliban, the Taliban has been
removed from power; the core of al Qaeda has been decimated; and the
United States is on the verge of removing combat troops from Afghanistan.
All the while, the United States has largely scaled down its detention
operations, with no new detainees sent to Guantánamo since before
President Obama came to office; with efforts underway to turn all detention
operations in Afghanistan over to that country’s authorities; and with
virtually each new overseas capture of a terrorism suspect by U.S.
authorities, citizen or otherwise, culminating in a civilian trial in a U.S.
federal court.41
These developments are relevant to the Guantánamo detainees in three
respects: first, in its only decision to interpret the AUMF,42 the Supreme
Court tied its reading of the detention authority provided by the statute to
the U.S. deployment in Afghanistan—and the state of armed conflict
evidenced by such a deployment. As Justice O’Connor explained in her
opinion for the plurality in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, “[W]e understand Congress’
grant of authority for the use of ‘necessary and appropriate force’ to include
the authority to detain for the duration of the relevant conflict.”43 And
although “that understanding may unravel” if “the practical circumstances
of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed
the development of the law of war,” Justice O’Connor invoked the status of
U.S. forces in Afghanistan in support of the conclusion that “that is not the
situation we face as of this date.”44 In light of this language, it is at least
conceivable that, once combat troops are removed from Afghanistan,
detainees may be able to relitigate the legality of their continuing detention,
and the AUMF may lose at least some of its force.45
Second, given the shift in focus for uses of force by the United States
from al Qaeda and the Taliban to groups with increasingly less of a
connection to Afghanistan or the September 11 attacks, numerous proposals
have emerged for a next-generation statutory framework to address what
some have called “extra-AUMF” threats.46 Although these proposals vary
in their details, they have the same two propositions at their core: the
groups that military force may be needed against today bear increasingly
40. See Johnson, supra note 20.
41. See Daskal & Vladeck, supra note 18, at 130–31 & n.52.
42. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
43. Id. at 521 (plurality opinion).
44. Id.
45. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Access to Counsel, Res Judicata, and the Future of Habeas
at Guantánamo, 161 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 78, 85–87 (2012).
46. See, e.g., ROBERT CHESNEY ET AL., A STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR NEXTGENERATION TERRORIST THREATS 8–11 (2013), available at http://media.hoover.org/sites/
default/files/documents/Statutory-Framework-for-Next-Generation-Terrorist-Threats.pdf.
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little resemblance—and relationship—to those that Congress believed it
was authorizing force against back in 2001; and, as such, the AUMF is an
increasingly problematic authority on which to base such uses of force.
Whether these developments justify an outright repeal of the AUMF, as
some have proposed, or rather its replacement with a use-of-force
authorization more specifically targeted at these newer threats, there
appears to be an emerging consensus that, once combat troops are removed
from Afghanistan, the AUMF’s days could—and should—be numbered.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the problem that the AUMF debate has run into
is Guantánamo. Whereas the president ostensibly has other sources of
authority to use military force to respond to emerging and imminent
terrorist threats,47 there are no other domestic law authorities that would
justify continuing long-term military detention without trial. And so
discussions of AUMF reform often run headlong into Guantánamo—and
the extent to which outright repeal of the AUMF would presumably vitiate
any continuing military detention authority over the remaining detainees.
Military detention under the laws of war requires war as a necessary
antecedent. So long as there is a group of detainees—of any size—whom
the government refuses to release or try, there will be enormous pressure on
the political branches to leave the AUMF in place.
Third, the decisive shift away from the military detention paradigm since
2006 underscores the extent to which the disposition of the remaining
Guantánamo detainees is a legacy problem—requiring only a backwardlooking solution, rather than a neutral approach that could apply equally to
past and future cases. The harder question is what such a solution might
look like.
C. A Section 412 Solution?
In a slightly different context, Congress has already grappled with this
question—and come up with its own resolution. As part of the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001,48 passed just six weeks after the September 11
attacks, Congress enacted section 412—codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a, and
titled “Mandatory Detention of Suspected Terrorists, Habeas Corpus,
Judicial Review.”49 That provision authorizes civil detention of any
noncitizen with the attorney general’s certification that the noncitizen meets

47. Although there is widespread debate over the scope of the president’s inherent war
powers, few question the existence of at least some Article II authority to act unilaterally to
defend the nation from imminent attack. Cf. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668
(1863) (“If a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only
authorized but bound to resist force by force. He does not initiate the war, but is bound to
accept the challenge without waiting for any special legislative authority.”).
48. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 412,
115 Stat. 272, 350–52 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a (2012)).
49. 8 U.S.C. § 1226a.
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one of six different criteria for removability,50 or “is engaged in any other
activity that endangers the national security of the United States.”51 The
statute contemplates detention for up to seven days, after which the detainee
must be charged with a crime, placed into removal proceedings, or
released.52
Tellingly, though, section 412 contemplates that noncriminal detention
may nevertheless continue if the attorney general pursues removal
proceedings, emphasizing that a detainee “whose removal is unlikely in the
reasonably foreseeable future, may be detained for additional periods of up
to six months only if the release of the alien will threaten the national
security of the United States or the safety of the community or any
person.”53 In other words, and by design, section 412 authorizes potentially
long-term civil detention of noncitizen terrorism suspects based upon a
specific and individualized showing of dangerousness.54
That section 412 anticipates detention longer than seven days is also
underscored by the judicial and legislative oversight the statute requires—
oversight that would only be relevant in cases in which longer detention
was sought.55 To that end, section 412(b) creates specific procedures for
review by habeas corpus of the initial determination that the individual was
subject to detention, and of the dangerousness determination contemplated
by subsection (a)(6).56 The statute confers jurisdiction in such cases over
the Supreme Court or any justice thereof, any D.C. Circuit judge, and any
district court “otherwise having jurisdiction to entertain it.”57 If filed
initially in district court, the statute invests the D.C. Circuit with exclusive
appellate jurisdiction58 and purports to articulate as the rule of decision in
all such cases “[t]he law applied by the Supreme Court and the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.”59 Finally, the
Attorney General must also provide Congress with reports on the use of this
detention authority every six months,60 which must include the number of

50. See id. § 1226a(a)(3)(A). In particular, section 412 incorporates the ineligibility and
removability criteria outlined in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(3)(A)(i), (a)(3)(A)(iii), (a)(3)(B),
1227(a)(4)(A)(i), (a)(4)(A)(iii), (a)(4)(B).
51. Id. § 1226a(a)(3)(B).
52. Id. § 1226a(a)(5).
53. Id. § 1226a(a)(6) (emphasis added).
54. For an illuminating discussion of the provision’s origins, see Al-Marri v. Wright,
487 F.3d 160, 191 (4th Cir. 2007), vacated en banc sub nom. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534
F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008), vacated sub nom. Al-Marri v. Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 (2009)
(mem.).
55. Habeas petitions typically become moot—prudentially, if not jurisdictionally—upon
the release of the detainee. See, e.g., Gul v. Obama, 652 F.3d 12, 16, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
56. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(b)(1).
57. Id. § 1226a(b)(2)(A).
58. Id. § 1226a(b)(3).
59. Id. § 1226a(b)(4).
60. Id. § 1226a(a)(7).
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noncitizens detained, the grounds for their detention, and the length of the
detention, among other details.61
To be sure, section 412 appears to assume that long-term detention could
only arise as an incident to removal proceedings—in which the
government’s goal would ostensibly be the removal of the detainee from the
country,62 and not his continuing, long-term incapacitation.63 Thus, as
Judge Motz has explained, “no provision of the Patriot Act allows for
unlimited indefinite detention.”64 But in so providing, section 412 thereby
authorizes limited and potentially indefinite detention in a hyperspecific
class of cases—those in which a detainee’s removal from the country is not
reasonably foreseeable, and in which the government can prove to a federal
judge that release of the detainee “will threaten the national security of the
United States or the safety of the community or any person.”65
Detention under section 412 and detention under the AUMF are thus
based on fundamentally different models: military detention under the
AUMF is tied to the laws of war, and the idea that all combatants can be
incapacitated for the duration of hostilities regardless of their individual
circumstances—because detention is preferable to more irrevocable forms
of military incapacitation. Civil detention under section 412, in contrast, is
a melding of two distinct concepts: short-term detention in anticipation of
subsequent legal proceedings, and long-term detention of individuals who
pose specific and identifiable risk to the safety of themselves or others. It is
therefore not surprising that the government has invoked section 412 in zero
cases to date; the authority it provides is far more modest—and subject to
far greater scrutiny—than that which has thus far been available under the
AUMF.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL, PRACTICAL, AND POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS
That section 412 could be read to provide statutory authority for the
continuing detention of those noncitizens currently held at Guantánamo
who continue to pose a threat to U.S. national security raises a host of
questions about the constitutional, practical, and political feasibility of such
an approach. This Part seeks to address those questions in turn.

61. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
§ 412(c), 115 Stat. 272, 352 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a note).
62. Indeed, section 412 only authorizes long-term detention of “[a]n alien . . . who has
not been removed under [8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)], and whose removal is unlikely in the
reasonably foreseeable future.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a)(6).
63. With respect to the “unreleasable” Guantánamo detainees, this may be a distinction
without a difference; for any number of reasons, it seems quite possible that the government
would be unable to effectuate the removal of an individual who has publicly been identified
as someone who is too dangerous to be released.
64. Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 191 (4th Cir. 2007), vacated en banc sub nom.
Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008), vacated sub nom. Al-Marri v.
Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 (2009) (mem.).
65. 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a)(6).
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A. Constitutional Constraints
The most obvious objection to section 412—and one that has been
leveled consistently since its enactment in 2001—is that the detention it
authorizes would violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.66 As
Professor Sinnar argued in her 2003 Stanford Law Review student note,67
the statute raises series procedural and substantive due process concerns,
with the certification procedures implicating the former and the detention
authority implicating the latter.68 I completely agree with Professor Sinnar
that the statute raises both sets of concerns; the critical point for present
purposes is that, as explained below, neither concern would be implicated in
cases in which section 412 was applied solely to the forty-five
“unreleasable” Guantánamo detainees.
With regard to procedural due process, Professor Sinnar’s basic objection
is that the statute fails to provide adequate procedures to protect against
wrongful certification.69 This argument is well taken. In cases in which the
Attorney General erroneously certifies a noncitizen under section 412(a)(3),
the only remedy the statute appears to contemplate is the habeas corpus
review described above.70 But the current law of the D.C. Circuit (which
would govern in such a case)71 provides that a habeas case generally
becomes moot upon a detainee’s release from custody.72 Thus, for
detainees who are released within the seven days provided by the statute (or
shortly thereafter), habeas review will presumably be unavailable. To be
sure, Bivens73 suits seeking damages after the fact should provide the
necessary backstop in such cases,74 but there, again, the D.C. Circuit’s
current jurisprudence militates rather decisively against the availability of
such relief.75 And even if courts were inclined to look more favorably upon
66. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
67. Shirin Sinnar, Note, Patriotic or Unconstitutional?: The Mandatory Detention of
Aliens Under the USA Patriot Act, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1419 (2003).
68. Id. at 1421. Insofar as the detainees in question are noncitizens held outside the
United States, the argument could be made that due process constraints are irrelevant, since
such detainees are not protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See, e.g.,
Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 2009), vacated and remanded per
curiam, 559 U.S. 131 (2010), reinstated as modified per curiam, 605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir.
2010). In this Article, however, I assume that the Due Process Clause does apply in such
cases, because (1) as explained below, section 412 appears to be specifically targeted toward
detention within the territorial United States, which would arguably bring with it full due
process protections; and (2) insofar as the Due Process Clause does not apply, the
constitutional objections outlined above would be moot.
69. See Sinnar, supra note 67, at 1429–41.
70. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(b).
71. See id. § 1226a(b)(4).
72. See Gul v. Obama, 652 F.3d 12, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
73. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971). In Bivens, the Supreme Court held that, in certain cases, individuals could sue
federal officers who violate their constitutional rights for damages directly under the
Constitution, even in the absence of a statutory cause of action authorizing such relief. Id. at
397.
74. See, e.g., Carlos M. Vázquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, State Law, the Westfall Act, and
the Nature of the Bivens Question, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 510–11 (2013).
75. See, e.g., Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 532 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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Bivens claims in this context, section 412 itself appears to foreclose such
relief:
Judicial review of any action or decision relating to this section (including
judicial review of the merits of a determination made under subsection
(a)(3) or (a)(6) of this section) is available exclusively in habeas corpus
proceedings consistent with this subsection. Except as provided in the
preceding sentence, no court shall have jurisdiction to review, by habeas
corpus petition or otherwise, any such action or decision. 76

Thus, there does appear to be serious procedural due process concerns with
section 412 in many—if not most—cases.
That said, it is difficult to understand the argument that a certification
under section 412(a)(3) could be erroneous in the case of individuals who
are, at the present, lawfully detained under the AUMF. Recall from above
that detention under the AUMF is putatively based upon “membership” in
al Qaeda or the Taliban.77 One of the criteria for certification under section
412(a)(3) is that the noncitizen “is a member of a terrorist organization”78
designated as a “foreign terrorist organization” (FTO) by the secretary of
state.79 Thus, being “part of” al Qaeda or the Taliban (or any other FTO,
for that matter) automatically suffices to satisfy one of the grounds for
certification under section 412. In other words, so long as a noncitizen is
properly subject to detention under the AUMF, they cannot be erroneously
certified under section 412(a)(3), thereby mooting the otherwise significant
procedural due process concerns.
Similar analysis can be undertaken with regard to Professor Sinnar’s
substantive due process objections—i.e., that “section 412 violates
substantive due process by authorizing government detention of some aliens
who pose neither a danger to the community nor a risk of flight.”80 Again, I
share Professor Sinnar’s view that, in many cases, section 412 could
authorize noncriminal detention of such individuals; indeed, the short-term
detention section 412 authorizes requires no individualized dangerousness
finding whatsoever by the attorney general, and would therefore raise
serious substantive due process concerns in cases in which the government
could not make out such a showing.81

76. 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(b)(1). And at least under the (controlling) law of the D.C. Circuit,
see id. § 1226a(b)(4), there is no constitutional problem with a statute that forecloses federal
jurisdiction over Bivens suits. See Al Janko v. Gates, 741 F.3d 136, 145–46 (D.C. Cir. 2014);
Al-Zahrani v. Rodriguez, 669 F.3d 315, 319–20 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
77. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(3)(A) (authorizing certification of noncitizens who are
“described” in § 1182(a)(3)(B)); id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(V) (identifying membership in a
“terrorist organization” as a ground for inadmissibility); id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(I) (defining
“terrorist organization” to include organizations “designated under section 1189 of this
title”).
79. See id. § 1189(a)(1).
80. Sinnar, supra note 67, at 1441.
81. The question would then arise whether substantive due process also prohibits certain
short-term detention, and if so, how much. The Supreme Court has held that it does not
violate the Fourth Amendment to detain a criminal suspect for up to forty-eight hours before
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Recall, however, that the long-term detention authorized by section 412
does require a showing of dangerousness—i.e., that “release of the alien
will threaten the national security of the United States or the safety of the
community or any person.”82
And unlike the attorney general’s
certification decision, there is little question that meaningful judicial review
of that determination is available; section 412’s habeas corpus procedures
are designed specifically to provide such review.83
The harder question is whether satisfaction of the statutory requirement
for long-term detention—that the “release of the alien will threaten the
national security of the United States or the safety of the community or any
person”—also satisfies substantive due process concerns. That question
requires some parsing of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this field.
In United States v. Salerno,84 for example, the Court upheld the detention
provisions of the Bail Reform Act of 1984,85 which authorize pretrial
detention of criminal defendants when the government showed by clear and
convincing evidence that the safety of the community could not otherwise
be guaranteed.86 Writing for a six-to-three majority, Chief Justice
Rehnquist held that the Due Process Clause requires that such detention be
in furtherance of a “legitimate regulatory goal,”87 such as community
safety, rather than an impermissible punitive purpose, and that it not be
“excessive in relation to the regulatory goal Congress sought to achieve.”88
To be sure, the statute in Salerno only authorized detention for a finite
period—until trial.89 But the Court’s analysis did not appear to turn on a
specific duration, all the more so given the varied lengths of pretrial
detention to which criminal defendants could be subjected without violating
the Act (or the Constitution).90
With these principles in mind, the Court in Foucha v. Louisiana91
invalidated the civil commitment of a criminal defendant who had been
found not guilty by reason of insanity, holding that such civil detention
could only satisfy due process in cases in which the detainees are both
mentally ill and dangerous—based upon specific and individualized
criteria.92 As Justice Thomas explained for the Court five years later in
Kansas v. Hendricks,93 “A finding of dangerousness, standing alone, is
ordinarily not a sufficient ground upon which to justify indefinite
presenting him before a neutral magistrate. See Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S.
44, 57 (1991).
82. 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a)(6).
83. See id. § 1226a(b).
84. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
85. Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3062,
3141–3150).
86. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e).
87. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747.
88. Id.
89. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i)(2).
90. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751.
91. 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
92. See id. at 81–83.
93. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
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involuntary commitment. We have sustained civil commitment statutes
when they have coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of some
additional factor, such as a ‘mental illness’ or ‘mental abnormality.’”94
And even then, the Court has “upheld preventive detention based on
dangerousness only when limited to specially dangerous individuals and
subject to strong procedural protections.”95
Although Foucha and Hendricks suggest that the additional factor must
be some mental incapacity on the part of the detainee, the Court’s 2001
decision in Zadvydas v. Davis at least hinted that unique national security
considerations—in addition to dangerousness—might suffice.96 After
explaining why the Due Process Clause precluded continuing detention of
removable noncitizens if their removal could not be effectuated (or was not
reasonably foreseeable) within six months,97 Justice Breyer included an
express caveat for “terrorism or other special circumstances where special
arguments might be made for forms of preventive detention and for
heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect
to matters of national security.”98 Taking these cases together, then, in the
context of noncitizens who are being detained because of their connection
to those groups directly responsible for the September 11 attacks,
substantive due process may be satisfied upon an individualized showing of
dangerousness and some additional limiting factor—perhaps one that
underscores the unavailability of alternative means of incapacitation.
So construed, serious constitutional concerns with section 412 remain—
even as applied to the Guantánamo detainees. The statute does require a
dangerousness showing in order to justify long-term detention, but does not
in its text contemplate any specific additional factors beyond dangerousness
(the “specially dangerous” showing to which Justice Thomas referred in
Foucha) that would provide sufficiently narrow limiting criteria to
ameliorate the constitutional objections. On its face, then, the long-term
detention authority provided by section 412 would appear to be inconsistent
with the Supreme Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence.
But insofar as Salerno stressed that such civil detention must not be
“excessive in relation to the regulatory goal Congress sought to achieve,”
one answer may well be a judge-made rule that the government must also
demonstrate the unavailability of any alternative means of disposition. That
is to say, the government must demonstrate that the detainee cannot be tried
for terrorism-related offenses by a civilian court or military commission and
that he cannot be transferred or released without gravely jeopardizing
national security.
At first blush, such a “least restrictive means” approach may seem
unsatisfying, since the government could presumably find any number of
grounds on which to argue that criminal prosecution is not a reasonably
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 358 (emphasis added).
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690–91 (2001).
Id.
See id. at 689.
Id. at 696.
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available alternative. But in that regard, post-AUMF developments may
actually militate in the other direction. In the same statute that created
section 412, Congress also began expanding the territorial scope of the
federal material support statutes—which make it a crime for any individual
to provide various forms of assistance to groups they know or should have
known to be designated FTOs99—to encompass conduct that takes place
wholly overseas.100 It was not until 2004 that the more sweeping material
support statute—18 U.S.C. § 2339B—was extended overseas,101 which is
one of the most significant reasons why so few of the Guantánamo
detainees, virtually all of whom were picked up based upon pre-2004
conduct, could ever be tried in a U.S. court.102 From 2004 to the present,
however, a wide range of “support” to designated FTOs, provided by
anyone anywhere in the world, has sufficed to render that person liable to
serious criminal charges within the United States.
Another significant development in this regard was the Supreme Court’s
2010 decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, in which the Court
blessed the government’s expansive reading of the potential scope of the
material support statutes, upholding them against First and Fifth
Amendment challenges.103 For better or worse, the “extraterritorialization”
of these offenses, coupled with the Humanitarian Law Project decision,
should dramatically increase the percentage of terrorism cases in which
criminal prosecution in U.S. civilian courts is at least jurisdictionally
possible.104 Indeed, the fact that no new detainees have been sent to
Guantánamo since before President Obama came to office only underscores
this point.
To be sure, how the government demonstrates that other alternatives are
unavailable is something of a sticky wicket. But the key for present
purposes is that the burden would necessarily be on the government in such
cases—to demonstrate both that the detainee continues to pose a serious
threat to public safety (a burden that may prove difficult to surmount after
as many as twelve years of detention at Guantánamo), and that no
alternative avenues for his incapacitation exist through criminal
prosecution, transfer to foreign custody, or otherwise. This burden should
be easier to satisfy in the Guantánamo legacy cases than in any other
instance. In new cases, for example, it would be difficult for the
government to demonstrate how it has enough evidence to establish
dangerousness, but not enough to bring a criminal prosecution under the
material support statute. And in the cases of the other remaining
Guantánamo detainees, it would be difficult for the government to
99. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A–2339B (2012).
100. See Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools Required
To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56,
§ 805(a)(1)(F), 115 Stat. 272, 377 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a)).
101. See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), Pub. L.
No. 108-458, § 6603(d), 118 Stat. 3638, 3763 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(d)).
102. See GUANTÁNAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE, supra note 15, at 22 n.21.
103. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2718–19 (2010).
104. See also Daskal & Vladeck, supra note 18, at 135–36.
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demonstrate that individuals whom the government has cleared for release
are nevertheless too dangerous to be released.
In other words, it is entirely because of the serious constitutional
concerns that would otherwise arise that long-term detention authority
under section 412 would be appropriately and strictly circumscribed to only
encompass cases of current Guantánamo detainees who are too dangerous
to be released, but against whom no criminal charges can be pursued. And
even then, that population might be further reduced by the periodic habeas
corpus review guaranteed by the same section—since the government
would ostensibly have to re-prove its case every six months, as opposed to
the one-off review currently required under the AUMF.
B. Practical and Political Constraints
There is nothing romantic about the solution this Article contemplates.
“In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without
trial is the carefully limited exception.”105 In a perfect world, there would
be no need for the government to have to subject any individuals to longterm detention without the full panoply of procedural protections attendant
to a criminal trial. And although all three branches of the federal
government have long since accepted the validity and legitimacy of such
detention as part of the armed conflict Congress authorized against al Qaeda
and its affiliates back in 2001, there are obvious reasons to cabin such
authority to the unique context in which it has arisen, rather than provide a
more general detention authority untethered to members of a specific group
who are involved in a specific conflict. Given the winding down of combat
operations in Afghanistan, those who oppose such detention as a categorical
matter may be content to wait it out, and hope that the authority provided by
the AUMF disappears without anything in its stead. Those with such a
view will no doubt criticize (or outright dismiss) a solution along the lines
sketched out above as far too great a violation of individual liberty to
possibly be worth the hypothetical upside—for example, the ability to
finally close Guantánamo, and the removal of the Guantánamo question
from the larger debate over the future of the AUMF.
Nor are defenders of the status quo likely to find much in this approach
worth supporting. This scheme could easily be criticized for greatly
increasing the risk that detainees that the government decreed to be
dangerous will eventually be released, whether because of the more
contextualized focus on current and future dangerousness, the requirement
that the underlying basis for detention be revisited every six months, or a
combination of the two. And insofar as such release would presumably be
into the United States, one can only imagine the uproar that would follow
even though (1) release would necessarily be conditioned upon a judicial
determination that the detainee in question no longer poses a threat to
national security; and (2) the detainee would presumably still be subject to
removal under U.S. immigration law.
105. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
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There are also a host of practical obstacles that could get in the way of
migrating the “unreleasable” Guantánamo detainees to a civil detention
regime. For starters, section 412 appears to contemplate that the detention
it authorizes will take place within the United States,106 and yet Congress,
in the NDAA, has continued to bar the transfer of detainees from
Guantánamo into the United States.107 Unless those restrictions could be
sidestepped or confronted on constitutional grounds, they would
presumably need to be repealed before such a policy could be adopted. And
once a new statute is required to effectuate such a scheme, it is hard to
believe that Congress would limit itself solely to repealing the transfer
restrictions—without revisiting the carefully calibrated procedural and
substantive standards it crafted over twelve years ago.
Relatedly, one might also criticize the above proposal on the ground that
it would morph section 412 into a very different authority than what
Congress sought to provide in 2001. That is, that the long-term detention
Congress actually meant to authorize through section 412 was not in
Guantánamo cases, but was only for cases such as Zadvydas, where a
noncitizen initially arrested within the United States was detained pending
deportation, and could not have his deportation effectuated within six
months of his arrest.108
These are all genuine concerns, and ones for which there is no
completely satisfying rejoinder. All that can be said in reply is that the
alternative is the deeply unsatisfying status quo—in which a smaller group
of detainees are hindering not only the U.S. government’s ability to close
Guantánamo, but also Congress’s ability to have a debate over the future of
U.S. counterterrorism policy that is not saddled by the weight of the unreleasable detainees. That is to say, if an unsatisfying civil detention
scheme—that can be at least theoretically circumscribed to only encompass
the legacy cases—is the price we must pay in order to close Guantánamo
and repeal the AUMF, it seems at least possible that a majority of the
American people, or, at least, their representatives in Congress, would be
willing to foot the bill.
CONCLUSION
In one sense, there is a deep, perhaps tragic, irony in the possibility that
section 412 could end up playing the role contemplated in this Article.
During the habeas litigation surrounding the case of Ali Saleh Kahlah alMarri, the one noncitizen arrested within the territorial United States who
was detained as an enemy combatant (for nearly eight years before pleading
guilty to civilian criminal charges), al-Marri routinely invoked section 412
106. Such a conclusion can be inferred from section 412’s investiture of detention
authority in the attorney general, who operates no overseas detention facilities, and in the
underlying assumption that removal of the detainee from the United States is one of the
dispositions the provision contemplates.
107. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66,
§ 1034, 127 Stat. 672, 851 (2013).
108. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 685–86 (2001).
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as evidence that Congress had not authorized his potentially indefinite
detention. More to the point, that precise argument was at the core of Judge
Motz’s opinion for the original three-judge Fourth Circuit panel that held
that the AUMF did not authorize al-Marri’s detention—because Congress
had provided a far more specific, and far more limited, detention authority
in the case of noncitizens detained within the United States.109 To turn
around now and argue that section 412 could be read to provide precisely
that authority, at least for those Guantánamo detainees who are too
dangerous to be released and who are not subject to alternative means of
incapacitation, appears to conflate the very distinction on which al-Marri—
and the original Fourth Circuit panel in his case—relied.
But the differences in paradigm matter. Unless one is categorically
opposed to all detention without trial, there is a lot more nuance in the longterm detention section 412 contemplates than in the detention authorized by
the AUMF. Whereas the latter asks only if the detainee is, or even was, a
member of al Qaeda or the Taliban, and allows such membership to be
established through evidence that in some cases has been “gossamer
thin,”110 the former requires far more specific, individualized, heightened,
and repetitive showings. The government must show that the detainee
(1) meets certain criteria for detention; (2) poses an ongoing threat to public
safety; and (3) cannot be incapacitated through other means. Indeed, longterm detention under section 412 simply would not have been available in
al-Marri’s case; even if the government could satisfy the first and second of
these prongs, the availability of an alternative forum (as underscored by his
subsequent criminal prosecution) necessarily precluded his potentially
indefinite civil detention.
Legal formalities aside, such an approach to detention after the AUMF
makes more sense as a normative matter, as well. An extreme measure,
such as noncriminal detention, should be a last resort—limited to cases in
which no alternative exists. And even then, it should only be justified if the
government can demonstrate to a neutral magistrate judge that the detainee
poses a continuing threat to public safety, even if the same evidence is
insufficient to sustain a criminal indictment or produce a conviction—a
prospect that is difficult to fathom given the current scope of the material
support statutes. Especially when the United States is no longer in a
position in which it is routinely capturing terrorism suspects on foreign
battlefields (as it was in the weeks and months after the AUMF was
enacted), we should expect the government to be able to prove on a retail
basis that for which the laws of war effectively only require wholesale
evidence.
These considerations do not change the fact that a solution grounded in—
or even modeled upon—section 412 still raises a panoply of legal, political,
109. Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 191 (4th Cir. 2007), rev’d en banc sub nom. AlMarri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008), vacated sub nom. Al-Marri v. Spagone,
555 U.S. 1220 (2009) (mem.).
110. Awad v. Obama, 646 F. Supp. 2d 20, 27 (D.D.C. 2009), aff’d, 608 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir.
2010).
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and practical concerns. To paraphrase Churchill’s famous quip about
democracy,111 however, such an approach may be the worst way forward
for U.S. counterterrorism policy—except for all of the others.

111. Sir Winston Churchill, Speech to the House of Commons (Nov. 1947), reprinted in
THE INTERNATIONAL THESAURUS OF QUOTATIONS § 231(7), at 146 (Rhoda Thomas Tripp ed.,
1970) (“Democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have
been tried from time to time.”).

